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NOTES
Papai: An International Perspective
Jonathan Kitchen remarked in The Employment of Merchant Seamen,
"Although factories.., sometimes explode, mines collapse and trains collide,
few places of work are as constant a source of risk to employees as ships.
Accidents are frequent and often spectacular. Rarely do the crew escape entirely
unscathed."'
I. THE FACTS
On March 13, 1989, John Papai went to work, just as he had done for the
previous two and one quarter years. He went to the Inland Boatman's Union
hiring hall in San Francisco, California. Through the services of the union hiring
hall, Papai and a coworker were hired for a one-day job by Harbor Tug and
Barge Company (HT&B). They reported to the HT&B dock in Alameda,
California. There, HT&B's Port Captain, Papai's supervisor for the day,
assigned him to the tug Pt. Barrow. His job title was "deckhand." Papai's duty
assignment for the day was to paint the deckhouse of the Pt. Barrow. At the
time, the Pt. Barrow was tied to the pier with no operational crew aboard and
the engines were not running. As instructed, Papai got a bucket of paint, a
brush, a portable ladder, and went to work painting the deckhouse of the Pt.
Barrow. Around 3:30 p.m., as Papai was climbing down the portable ladder, the
ladder shifted, causing him to fall, and he injured his knee. John Papai filed suit
against HT&B in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California as a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688.?
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN SEAMAN-STATUS JURISPRUDENCE
To understand the holding of Papai, an understanding of recent develop-
ments in seaman status opinions is essential. In McDermott International, Inc.,
v. Wilander, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held "[t]he key to
seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation.,
4
Justice O'Connor further held, ". . . that a necessary element of the connection
is that a seaman perform the work of a vessel."5 In so doing, the Supreme
Court abandoned earlier jurisprudence limiting seaman status to those who
actively aided in the navigation of the vessel or "hand, reef, and steer"
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Jonathan S. Kitchen, The Employment of Merchant Seamen 453 (1980).
2. No attempt is made here to examine employment law-related issues. The subject matter of this
discussion is strictly limited to an examination of seaman status questions in an international context.
3. Petitioner's Brief at 2-5, Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 117 S. Ct. 1535
(1997) (No. 95-1621).
4. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355, 111 S. Ct. 807, 817 (1991).
5. Wilander, 498 U.S. at 355, 111 S. Ct. at 817.
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requirements. Noting the extensive precedent in pre-Jones Act general maritime
cases, as well as Jones Act cases, to extend seaman status to maritime employees
whose duties bore little relationship to. navigation, the majority held that there
was ample authority in American law to adopt the broader standard.6
In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, the court expanded the Wilander analysis, adding
a durational element. The Chandris seaman-status test is two-pronged: first, the
"employee's duties must contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or the
accomplishment of its mission," and second, the employee "must have a
connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels)
that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature."7 The durational
requirement is that the employee must spend at least thirty percent of his time
aboard ship to qualify for seaman status.8
III. THE CASE
Harbor Tug and Barge Company, Papai's employer, argued that he did not
satisfy the Chandris test for seaman status. HT&B did not dispute that Papai's
work aboard the Pt. Barrow contributed to the function of the vessel or the
accomplishment of its mission. Nor did HT&B dispute that the Pt. Barrow was
a vessel in navigation. Rather, Harbor Tug and Barge contended that John
Papai's connection to the Pt. Barrow and its fleet of tugs was insufficiently
substantial in terms of both its duration and nature to satisfy the Chandris test.9
When Mr. Papai's case came before the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, announced a new test, based on his
understanding of the underlying purposes of Chandris. Rather than decide the
case based on Harbor Tug and Barge Company's argument that Papai did not
meet the Chandris durational requirement, Justice Kennedy asserted that the
proper test to determine John Papai's status as a seaman was a "perils of the sea
test."" Justice Kennedy held that the purpose of the Chandris test was to
identify and protect those persons whose duties take them to sea and expose them
to its perils. According to him, John Papai was not a seaman and not entitled
to the protections which United States law extends to seamen, because his duties
on the day he was injured working aboard the Pt. Barrow did not take him to sea
that day and expose him to its perils."
6. Wilander, 498 U.S. at 343, 111 S. Ct. at 811-13.
7. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2190 (1995).
8. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 367, 115 S. Ct. at 2189.
9. Papai, 117 S. Ct. at 1540.
10. Id. at 1542.
11. Id.
The interplay of benefits between the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act and Jones
Act seaman status does not form a significant part of this inquiry. The availability of benefits under
the LHWCA does not form part of the seaman status inquiry. In addition, the availability of
LHWCA benefits to an injured maritime worker should not inform a policy decision to limit seaman
status. Each of the other nations considered here have social welfare programs and benefits equal
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W. ARGUMENT
In announcing his "perils of the sea" test, Justice Kennedy, and the other
members of the High Bench who voted with him, adopted a standard which is
at variance with the admiralty traditions of the rest of the English-speaking
world. Admiralty jurisprudence around the world establishes that the proper test
to determine seaman status in cases like Papai is the "service of the ship" rule
alone. This language closely tracks that of Wilander, without accretions found
in Chandris or Papai. Under this test, an employee is considered to be a seaman
belonging to the ship if the services which he performs are connected with the
ship as a seagoing instrument of navigation.
In The Paquete Habana, Mr. Justice Gray, writing for the majority,
commented on the role of international law in admiralty and asserted, "Interna-
tional law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending on it are duly presented for their determination .... resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; .... "' Given the uniquely
international nature of admiralty law and the easy reference which American
admiralty law makes to the holdings of other nations' admiralty courts, an
examination of the law of other nations having a substantial admiralty tradition
provides additional insight into Papai. A careful reading of the laws of other
nations possessing similar traditions at admiralty to our own clearly demonstrates
that Justice Kennedy's opinion in Papai is at variance with the practice of the
international admiralty community.
V. THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY TRADITION
Great Britain has a long standing tradition of Admiralty law which was
transmitted throughout the world by the British Empire. Many nations
possessing their own distinct admiralty traditions built their law on the
foundation of British admiralty law. As such, Great Britain's maritime law
regarding the tug and her crew is the most appropriate place to begin an
examination of the international jurisprudence in cases similar to Papai.
The tug as a distinct type of vessel recognized in Admiralty is a product of
the steam engine and, ironically, the needs of the early nineteenth century sailing
merchant marine. The competition between American and English clipper ship
owners during this period brought them to the realization that their voyages were
really from warehouse to warehouse and not port to port. Adverse conditions of
wind and sea could conspire to keep a sailing merchantman in harbor for days
or superior to those available under the LHWCA, yet do not prohibit injured brown-water workers
from claiming seaman status remedies. The most exhaustive treatment of this subject can be found
in Kitchen, supra note 1, a detailed examination of British law, social welfare policy, and procedure,
with useful comparisons to other major maritime nations.
12. The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 299 (1900).
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or even weeks on end after it had cleared the pier. The harbor tug evolved as
a method to reduce the time lost on the ends of voyages. 3
The first tug appeared on the River Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland,
in 1819, where it was used to tow lighters, and on the River Tyne, near
Newcastle shortly afterwards. The Lady Dundas was the first tug to appear in
the River Thames, in approximately 1832. The first tug to appear in America
was probably a steam paddlewheeler which worked on the Hudson River
sometime around 1825.14
As is the nature of all human affairs, Admiralty cases involving tugs
appeared shortly thereafter. The first recorded British decision regarding a tug
and tow was apparently The Betsey." The United States seems to have beaten
the British to the punch with its first tugboat case in 1830, Smith v. Pierce.6
As early as 1849, British admiralty courts had decided that a tug was a
vessel, albeit of an unusual type. In The Princess Alice, 7 the court pronounced:
"[A] towage service may be described as the employment of one vessel to
expedite the voyage of another, when nothing more is required than the
accelerating [sic] her progress."'"
British statutory law regulates the crewmen working aboard tugs as merchant
mariners. In this respect they are regulated in the same manner as the officers
and ratings employed aboard the larger vessels, generally thought of as "blue
water" vessels. The most significant statutes in this respect are the Merchant
Shipping Acts of 1894 and 1970. These Acts of Parliament provide for the
certification of the members of ships' crews, notably masters, mates, and
engineers. Other provisions of the various merchant Shipping Acts which are
applicable generally to both tugs and merchant ships include measurement and
registration of tonnage, inspection requirements, seamen's documents, crew
accommodations, and disciplinary requirements. 9
It is important to note that tugs also occupy their own special place in the
British mercantile marine statutory scheme. A specializedmariner's certification
for a Tugmaster exists. The presence of a licensed tugmaster aboard a seagoing
tug permits the vessel to dispense with the requirement of a certified navigating
officer under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1906. British statutory law also
makes a distinction betweenhome-going and foreign-going tugs. This distinction
extends to different crew requirements and periods of service required for
certification. Also, special vessel inspection and registration schemes exist for
tugs, including the provision for special load lines.2 °
13. Alex L. Parks and Edward V. Cattell, Jr., The Law of Tug, Tow, and Pilotage 3 (1994).
14. Id. at 3-4.
15. 166 Eng. Rep. 717 (Adm. 1843).
16. 1 La. 349 (1830); Parks and Cattell, supra note 13, at 6.
17. 166 Eng. Rep. 914 (1849).
18. The Princess Alice, 166 Eng. Rep. 914, 915 (1849).
19. Parks and Cattell, supra note 13, at 429-32.
20. Id. at 429-35.
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The Pt. Barrow, the tug upon which Mr. Papai was employed, was
not in active service on the day when he was injured. Rather it was laid up
alongside the HT&B pier for maintenance which Mr. Papai was to perform.
This fact seems to have been accorded great weight in Justice Kennedy's
opinion.2
British Admiralty law resolved the question of the right of workers
employed aboard laid up vessels to claim seaman status and remedies before the
turn of the current century. The first British case to examine the right of a
person employed on a vessel laid up in harbor to claim seaman's remedies was
The Jane and Matilda, in 1823.22 It was this case which announced the service
of the ship rule in such instances. There, a woman employed aboard the ship
Jane and Matilda was permitted to pursue an in rem action for wages due her
for services as a shipkeeper performed while the vessel was laid up in harbor
following the bankruptcy of the owner. In pronouncing judgment in favor of the
claimant, Lord Stowell held that the work of keeping and maintaining a ship
while laid up in port was the work of a seaman, entitling the performer to a
seaman's remedies. In holding that the duties of a shipkeeper were those of a
seaman, the court held, "It may be said, and has been said, that the person acting
aboard, acts (and is expected to do so) as a mariner likewise."23 In awarding
the woman keeper of the ship Jane and Matilda £64, 14s for back pay (a truly
large sum of money in 1823), the court remarked: "Here are duties performed,
which must be performed by somebody on board the ship."
24
The "service of the ship" principle, especially as it relates to maritime
workers aboard ships in harbor, next surfaces in British jurisprudence with The
Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of the S.S.
Michigan.23 In that case, the mate of the S.S. Michigan was permitted to
maintain an in rem claim against the vessel for wages due him. The services
which he performed to merit compensation were the oversight of maintenance
and repair work to the ship while she was in dry-dock.26
In granting a maritime lien for wages against the vessel, the traditional
seaman's remedy, Justice Wills extended the holding of The Jane and Matilda,
saying, "The right to proceed in rem for services rendered on board a ship
apparently extends to every class of person who is connected with the ship as a
ship, as a seagoing instrument of navigation, or of transport of cargo from one
place to another, and to services rendered by such persons in harbour just as
much as to services rendered by them at sea."27 He also went on to hold that
21. Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535, 1542 (1997).
22. The Jane and Matilda, 166 Eng. Rep. 67 (1823).
23. The Jane and Matilda, 166 Eng. Rep. at 68.
24. The Jane and Matilda, 166 Eng. Rep. at 69.
25. 25 Q.B.D. 339 (1890).
26. R v. Judge of City of London Court and Owners of S.S. Michigan, 25 Q.B.D. 339, 340
(1890).
27. Id. at 342-43.
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plaintiffs services were maritime services, even though the ship was actually in
harbor at the time. 8
A review of British statutory law and jurisprudence indicates that John Papai
would have been considered a seaman at the time of his injuries aboard the Pt.
Barrow, had it been in British waters or jurisdiction. The Princess Alice held
that a tug was clearly a vessel. Further, the extensive regulation of tugs such as
the Pt. Barrow as merchant vessels and their crews as merchant seamen under
the various Merchant Shipping Acts and the accompanying regulations places
both vessels and those working aboard squarely within the ambit of the merchant
marine. Finally, the jurisprudence of The Jane and Matilda and The Queen v.
Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of the S.S. Michigan shows
that the service status of the vessel is immaterial. Long ago, British courts
decided that maintenance of a vessel while laid up was equally the work of the
ship and equally deserving of seaman status protection and seaman's remedies.
VI. THE BRITISH TRADITION AT ADMIRALTY RECEIVED
The Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890 transferred the admiralty
practice, procedure, jurisdiction, and jurisprudence possessed and exercised by
the English High Court of Justice to the courts of the British colonies. This
statute abolished the Imperial Vice-Admiralty courts then sitting in each of Her
Majesty's colonies and constituted the Admiralty jurisdiction in the High Court
of each colony. It also allowed each colony to vest limited Admiralty jurisdic-
tion in such inferior colonial courts as the colony desired in a manner similar to
the jurisdiction of the County Courts in England. One of the primary purposes
of the act was to eliminate confusion. British Vice-Admiralty courts and colonial
courts previously sat side by side and exercised concurrent jurisdiction.29
This issue of concurrent jurisdiction had the potential to create significant
conflict of laws problems. Similar causes of action could be brought before
colonial courts and the admiralty courts, which would apply different rules of
law. This conflict could result in different results in the cases and different
rankings of claims. This problem was particularly acute in South Africa, where
the colonial courts were applying the Roman-Dutch law as received there and the
Vice-Admiralty courts were applying English admiralty law."
VII. AUSTRALIA
Australian admiralty law is strongly founded on the British tradition, with
modifications specific to Australian conditions and statutory alterations made
since that nation gained its independence. The definition of a tug and towage is
28. Id. at 343.
29. D.J. Shaw, Q.C., Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa 2-3 (1987).
30. Id. at 3-4.
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drawn from the same source as in Great Britain, The Princess Alice of 1849.
This case's definition of towage as the employment of one vessel to expedite the
voyage of another has been received in Australian jurisprudence approvingly in
a line of cases beginning in 1875 and extending to 1982. 3'
Statutory amendment to the received British precedents have considerably
broadened to definition of a vessel. The Navigation Act of 1912 and the
Admiralty Act of 1988, define a ship as any "vessel used in navigation by water,
however propelled or moved."32  Other Australian Commonwealth statutes,
including the Lighthouses Act of 1911 and the Seamen's Compensation Act of
1911 only restrict from the statutory definition of vessels conveyances ordinarily
propelled by oars. Statutes in the various Australian states and territories
similarly exempt oar-propelled conveyances from the statutory definition of
vessels.33
Statutory and case law in all Australian jurisdictions contains a
navigational element in the vessel status test. Drawing from British case
law, the navigation requirement contains an intent element. Whether or not
any vessel is "in navigation," may not depend so much on whether the
structure can or will be navigated as whether it was intended to be
navigated. Following this line of reasoning, a flying boat was held not
to be a vessel in navigation, but a ship recently launched and not yet
fitted out was.34
Seaman status is equally broad in Australian jurisprudence drawn directly
from the language of The Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court and the
Owners of the S.S. Michigan. A seaman is any person "who is connected with
the ship as a ship."" Accordingly, the term is extremely broad, including every
member of a ship's complement, other than the captain, and anyone otherwise
employed in service on the ship. Jurisprudence has held the term to include
pursers, ship's carpenters, and cooks.36
Australian jurisprudence has adopted the reasoning found in The Jane and
Matilda and The Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of
the S.S. Michigan. In The "Collaroy": Harris v. Robertson,3 7 the Vice-
Admiralty Court of New South Wales was held io have jurisdiction to entertain
a claim for wages of a person who had the charge of a vessel while in harbor as
its caretaker.3" Davies and Dickey also cite The Queen v. Judge of the City of
London Court and the Owners of the S.S. Michigan as an authority creating
31. Martin Davies and Anthony Dickey, Shipping Law 364 n.94 (1990).
32. Id. at 1-2.
33. Id. at 2-4.
34. Id. at 8.
35. R. v. Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of the S. S. Michigan, 25 Q.B.D.
339, 343 (1890), cited in Davies and Dickey, supra note 31, at 97.
36. Davies and Dickey, supra note 31, at 97 nn. 38 & 39.
37. (1887) 3 N.S.W.W.N. 97.
38. Id.
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Australian precedent for the proposition that the term seaman includes the
caretakers of ships and even stevedores.39
The most recent Australian consideration of the line of reasoning which
began with The Jane and Matilda, is found in Liosatos v. Australian National
Line.4 ° In Liosatos, Chief Justice Barwick of the High Court of Australia
applied the "belonging to the ship" reasoning of The Queen v. Judge of the City
of London Court and the Owners of the S.S. Michigan to the case of a seaman
incapacitated by an illness which was not contracted during the currency of his
articles. Rather, his illness was contracted during earlier service aboard his ship.
Chief Justice Barwick held that it is the service of the ship which creates the
relationship expressed as "belonging to the ship," which gives rise to the
seaman's duties and rights as embodied in case of the mate of the S.S.
Michigan.' Chief Justice Barwick also drew support form Lord Stowell's
opinion in The Jane and Matilda, regarding the nature of the work itself as
giving rise to seamen's claims, "Supposing the informality in the mode of hiring,
still if the work has been done, and properly done, it entitles the performer to the
common remuneration.,
42
A review of Australian jurisprudence demonstrates that John Papai would
have been considered a seaman at the time of his injuries aboard the Pt. Barrow,
had the accident occurred under Australian jurisdiction and law. The Australian
Admiralty tradition draws its authority, precedent, and jurisdiction from Britain
through the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act. Therefore, the jurisprudence of
The Princess Alice, The Jane and Matilda, and The Queen v. Judge of the City
of London Court and the Owners of the S.S. Michigan regarding vessel status and
service status is highly persuasive in the Australian Commonwealth. There could
be no clearer demonstration of the continuity of this reasoning than the extension
of this line of thought through The "Collaroy": Harris v. Robertson and
Liosatos v. Australian National Line. Accordingly, the work of Mr. Papai aboard
the Pt. Barrow while alongside her pier would be considered the work of the
ship and he, therefore, a seaman and entitled to seaman's remedies, had the
accident occurred in Sydney Harbour.
VIII. CANADA
Canadian Admiralty jurisdiction is also based on the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act of 1890, as enlarged and clarified by the Statute of Westminster,
1931. The Statute of Westminster accorded to Canada the complete power to
establish its own admiralty courts, fix their jurisdictions and regulate their
practice and procedure. The Canadian Admiralty Act of 1934 implemented this
39. Davies and Dickey, supra note 31, at 97 n.41.
40. 111 C.L.R. 282 (1964).
41. Id. at 287-88.
42. Id. at 288 (citing The Jane and Matilda, 166 Eng. Rep. at 69).
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power one year later. While, like the United States, concurrent jurisdiction in
admiralty exists between the federal and provincial courts, only the federal courts
sitting in admiralty can exercise in-rem jurisdiction.43
Canadian statutory law treats tugs as merchant vessels and their crews as
merchant seamen. The Canada Shipping Act grants authority to regulate tugs to
the Ministry of Transport under the Canada Shipping Act of 1985. These areas
of regulation include safe manning regulations, design of hulls and accommoda-
tions, and safe working practices. A combination of regulation and various
sections of the Act establish manning and training requirements for the crews of
tugs.
44
The Canada Shipping Act of 1985, Sections 109 and 110, Safe Manning
Regulations, and Ships' Deck Watch Regulations regulate the composition of
Canadian tug crews. Compliance with the manning regulations for seamen
aboard tugs is ensured by the provision for determination of the adequacy of the
complement as part of the vessel inspection and licensure process. The marine
surveyor who inspects the tug is required to satisfy himself as to the competency
and make-up of the crew before a license is issued. As with any other vessel,
a Canadian-flag tug must be inspected every four years or whenever it has
undergone structural damage or major alterations.45
Canadian tug crew members, with the exception of independent tug
operators, are unionized and have the right to bargain collectively with their
employers. The hours of work and wages are determined by collective
bargaining. However, the duties of masters and members of the crew are
governed by the Ships' Deck Watch Regulations. Seamen continue to be entitled
to a maritime lien for wages and Section 212 of the Canada Shipping Act
extends the same rights, liens, and remedies which are traditional to seamen to
the masters of tugs as well. Interestingly, the Canada Shipping Act still retains
the ancient prohibition on the attachment garnishment of seamen's wages due or
owing.
46
In Jorgensen v. "The Chasina, ' the court cites both The Jane and
Matilda and The Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of
the S.S. Michigan as the proper Canadian precedent in the case of a watch-
man/caretakeraboard ship. In denying Jorgensen's claim, the court distinguishes
the facts from those in the above cases. Jorgensen's position as part owner of
the vessel and the fact that the vessel was actually in the hands of a dockyard for
repair sufficiently distinguish the case from the facts of Jane and Matilda and
The Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of the S.S.
Michigan to require the court to deny his claim.
48
43. Parks and Cattell, supra note 13, at 11-12.
44. Id. at 435-38.
45. Id. at 436.
46. Id. at 436-37.
47. [1926] 1 D.L.R. 1193.
48. Jorgensen v. "The Chasina" [1926] 1 D.L.R. 1193, 1196.
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Two cases from the 1898 session of the Exchequer Court of Canada
regarding the ship Flora demonstrate the continuity of British jurisprudence in
Canada. In Connor v. The "Flora ", the court interpreted the Merchant Shipping
Act of 1854 (Great Britain) and the Inland Water Seamen's Act (Canada) to
define a seaman as "every person employed or engaged in any capacity on board
any ship, except masters and pilots."49 Accordingly, the court allowed Miss
Mattie Connor, employed aboard the Flora to tend a candy stand, a seaman's
maritime lien against the vessel for her wages. °
In Brown v. The "Flora ",5 the same court examined the case of a
watchman employed to tend the vessel while laid up for the winter. The court
disallowed Mr. Brown's claim for a maritime lien against the vessel, not because
the work was not seaman's work, but rather because the vessel was not in
commission. Throughout the time when Mr. Brown was tending to the vessel,
it was dismantled with machinery removed, and was "little better than a hulk.
52
An examination of Canadian statutory law, regulation, and jurisprudence
shows that John Papai would have been considered a seaman at the time of his
injuries aboard the Pt. Barrow. The Canadian Admiralty tradition similarly
draws its authority, precedent, and jurisdiction from Britain through the Colonial
Courts of Admiralty Act as enlarged by the Statute of Westminster. Accordingly,
the jurisprudence of The Princess Alice, The Jane and Matilda, and The Queen
v. Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of the S.S. Michigan
regarding vessel status and service status is equally sound in Canada. The
Canada Shipping Act, Safe Manning Regulations, and Ships' Deck Watch
Regulations clearly bring tugs such as the Pt. Barrow and those employed aboard
them within the definition of merchant vessels and merchant seamen. John
Papai's work aboard the Pt. Barrow while alongside her pier would have been
considered the work of the ship and he, therefore, a seaman entitled to seaman's
remedies, had the accident occurred in Canada.
IX. NEW ZEALAND
Much like Canada and Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand includes the
regulation of tugs within its overall merchant shipping regulation scheme. As in
Australia, the basis of Admiralty jurisdiction in New Zealand is based on the
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890.53 The primary statutory regulation
is the Shipping and Seamen Act of 1952. The regulations promulgated under the
authority of this act govern the construction manning, and survey of tugs. The
act itself also contains specific provisions regarding the employment of crew and
carriage of dangerous goods. This regulatory scheme establishes various classes
49. Connor v. The "Flora" [1898] 6 Ex. C. R. 131, 132.
50. Id. at 132.
51. Brown v. The "Flora" [1898] 6 Ex. C.R. 133.
52. Id. at 134.
53. Parks and Cattell, supra note 13, at 14.
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of ships depending on size, motive power, and intended area of operation. This
scheme subjects tugs to the same requirements as all other vessels. Tugs must
comply with the Shipping (Cargo Ships) Construction and Survey Rules and
Shipping (Lifesaving Appliances) Rules, as well as specific requirements
regarding radio, radar, and echo-sounding equipment.54
Since most New Zealand tugs are harbor tugs which generally do not go
beyond the confines of their home ports, they are considered restricted limit ships
under section 250 of the act. As such, they are governed as restricted-limits
vessels subject to the Shipping Restricted Limits Notice of 1964, Shipping
(Manning of Restricted-Limit Ships) Rules of 1976. Tugs are defined in these
regulatory provisions as ships engaged in towing, pushing, or otherwise
propelling barges, bulks, or other ships. The regulations also control the
qualifications of the master and engineer of such vessels and their minimum
crewing requirements."
Tugs which do trade outside the restricted limits of their home ports,
operating only on the east coast of the North Island between North Cape and
East Cape, with a register length of less than ninety feet are governed as to
officers, by the Shipping (Manning of Towboats) Notice of 1963. The Shipping
(Manning of Restricted-Limits Ships) Rules governs the minimum total
complement of such vessels. Tugs trading beyond the restricted limits area are
governed by the act itself, which prescribes qualifications and minimum numbers
of deck and engineering officers, seamen, and engine room staff by the size of
the vessel. It is important to note that statutory and regulatory provisions only
set a minimum standard. Negotiated industrial awards between the employers
and unions may set a -substantially higher standard than statutes and regula-
tions.56
The Supreme Court of New Zealand commented on the binding nature of
British Admiralty jurisdiction through the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act and
of British precedent in The "Queen Eleanor"." In asserting that the applicable
law was prescribed by the terms of the Act, the court held itself to be bound by
applicable British precedent. Accordingly, the court declined to entertain
arguments based on American cases and considered British precedent alone as
dispositive of the case.s
New Zealand includes seamen in its statutory workers' compensation
scheme. The Workers' Compensation Act 1956 contains provisions which apply
exclusively to seamen. 0. E. Smuts-Kennedy, editor of MacDonald's Law
Relating to Workers' Compensation in New Zealand, cites a number of cases
which, although not decided specifically under the act, are illustrative of who are
seamen under New Zealand Law and who are not. These include The Jane and
54. Id. at 438-39.
55. Id. at 439.
56. Id. at 439-40.
57. [1899] 18 N.Z.L.R 78.
58. Id. at 84.
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Matilda, R. v. Judge of City of London Court and Owners of S.S. Michigan, and
The "Collaroy ": Harris v. Robertson.9 Smuts-Kennedy also cites a number of
other British cases which illustrate seaman status under New Zealand Law:
Chislett v. Macbeth & Co.;6° In the Goods of Hale;6 "The Hanna";62 and
Corbett v. Pearce.63
A review of New Zealand statutory law, regulation, and jurisprudence
indicates that John Papai would have been considered a seaman at the time of his
injuries aboard the Pt. Barrow, had the accident occurred in New Zealand waters.
The New Zealand Admiralty tradition also draws its authority, precedent, and
jurisdiction from Britain through the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act. The
jurisprudence of The Princess Alice, The Jane and Matilda, and The Queen v.
Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of the S.S. Michigan
regarding vessel status and service status can be considered as equally valid in
New Zealand. New Zealand's extensive regulatory control of tugs clearly brings
them and those employed aboard them within the definition of merchant vessels
and merchant seamen. The Shipping and Seamen Act of 1952, Shipping (Cargo
Ships) Construction and Survey Rules, Shipping (Lifesaving Appliances) Rules,
Shipping Restricted Limits Notice of 1964, and Shipping (Manning of Restricted-
Limit Ships) Rules of 1976 all serve to define those employed aboard tugs most
clearly as merchant seamen.
X. SouTH AFRICA
Admiralty law in the Republic of South Africa is a hybrid of civilian and
British practice. The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 effected
significant codification and reform of South African admiralty practice.
However, by its terms, the act incorporates the British Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act of 1890. For ;example, a maritime claim includes any claim
which fell within the ambit of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act. The South
African act also provides that the law applicable to any matters which fell within
the jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty is the law which the High
Court of Justice of the United Kingdom would have applied in exercising its
Admiralty jurisdiction. This was the opinion taken by South African courts in
Peca Enterprises Ltd. v. Registrar of the Supreme Court of Natal."
Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co. v. MV Fidias5 demonstrates the
interplay between South African statutory law and British Admiralty precedent.
59. Macdonald's Law Relating to Workers' Compensation in New Zealand 112-15 (0. E. Smuts-
Kennedy ed., 3d ed. 1958).
60. 2 K.B. 36 (1909).
61. 2 I.R 362 (1915).
62. 1 L.R.-Adm. & Eccl. 283 (1866).
63. 2 K.B. 422 (1904).
64. 1977 (1) SA 76 (N) 83. Shaw, supra note 29, at 1-2.
65. 1986 (1) S.A.L.R. 714.
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The issue at bar revolved around the definition of a maritime lien. While the
South African Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 provides that
a maritime claim may be enforced in rem if the claimant has a maritime lien, it
provides no definition of what a maritime lien is. Because this act incorporates
by its terms the jurisdiction and law of British Admiralty courts as contained in
the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890, British law fills the lacuna.66
In holding that the claim of a "necessaries man" was not a maritime lien,
giving rise to an in-rem claim against the vessel, the court held itself to be bound
by the terms of the act which incorporated the Colonial Courts of Admiralty
Act. Accordingly, the six categories of maritime lien known to English
admiralty were applied to the case. As the claim of a "necessaries man" was not
among these, the court felt itself bound to deny the claim and refused to broaden
the definition of a maritime lien beyond the scope provided by English tradition.
In a number of places in the opinion, the court holds British admiralty precedent
as binding upon it."
In Win. Brandt's Sons & Co. v Waikiwi Shipping Co.,6s the court granted
a lien over the vessel for the wages of the crew who were required to remain
aboard and maintain it while the ship was laid up. The Waikiwi Pioneer was laid
up in the port of Durban, South Africa under a writ of arrest. The nature of its
cargo required that the ship's equipment be run in order to prevent the ruin of
the cargo. A crew was required to remain on board to do so. If the cargo
spoiled, it would render the vessel itself practically worthless. The court held
that the salaries of the crew employed to superintend and maintain the Waikiwi
Pioneer gave rise to a claim against the ship in rem. Further the court allowed
the mortgagee who paid the crew to be subrogated to their seamen's rights due
to the extraordinary circumstances.6 9
A review of South African jurisprudence and statutes demonstrate that John
Papai would have been considered a seaman at the time of his injuries aboard the
Pt. Barrow, had the accident occurred under South African law. South African
courts sitting in Admiralty draw their authority, precedent, and jurisdiction from
the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act through the Admiralty Jurisdiction
Regulation Act 105 of 1983. Therefore, the reasoning of The Princess Alice, The
Jane and Matilda, and The Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court and the
Owners of the S.S. Michigan regarding vessel status and service status is equally
valid and binding in the Republic of South Africa. Win. Brandt's Sons & Co.
Ltd. v Waikiwi Shipping Co. Ltd. and Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co.
Ltd. V MV Fidias stand as clear demonstration of the continuity of the reasoning
which began with The Jane and Matilda. Accordingly, the work of Mr. Papai
aboard the Pt. Barrow while alongside her pier would be considered the work of
66. Id. at 714-16.
67. Id. at 717.
68. 1973 (4) S.A.LR. 358 (N).
69. Win. Brandt's Sons & Co. v. Waikiwi Shipping Co., 1973 (4) S.A.L.R. 358, 358-60 (N).
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the ship and he, therefore, a seaman and entitled to seaman's remedies, had the
accident occurred in South Africa.
XI. CONCLUSION
Careful examination of the statutory law and jurisprudence of the major
admiralty jurisdictions of the English-speaking world demonstrates conclusively
that a uniform practice exists regarding seamen employed aboard vessels in
harbor. The jurisprudence universally establishes that the proper test to
determine seaman status in cases like Papai is the "service of the ship" rule, not
Justice Kennedy's "perils of the sea" test. In American jurisprudence, the
"service of the ship" rule closely tracks the "work of the vessel" language of
Wilander, without the Chandris or Papal expansions. Had the Pt. Barrow been
flying the flag of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa
and in her registered harbor on March 13, 1989, when John Papai was injured
in her service, he would have been considered a seaman and received seaman's
benefits. Justice Kennedy, in articulating a previously unheard-of extension to
the test in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, derogates from the experience and wisdom
of the rest of the English speaking-world and takes a major step in the
divorcement of American admiraltyjurisprudence from its previously internation-
al roots.
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